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Abstract 
With the introduction of social robots into society arise new possibilities of cooperation between ethicists 
and roboticists, as social robots will be required to function in ways that are ethically acceptable, see e.g. 
(Wallach and Allen, 2009), (Arkin, 2009). However, ethics is traditionally a very informal field and robotics is 
a very technical one, so some problems of communication in the process of this cooperation are to be 
expected. Deontic logic can play a mediating role, at the same time providing tools for formalizing ethical 
principles in a way that can be justified from a philosophical point of view and to be used as a foundation 
for safe computational implementations. The overall project of devising a robot ethics can thus become a 
fruitful interdisciplinary field bringing insights together from philosophy, logic, and engineering, see e.g. 
(Wallach and Allen, 2009), (Bringsjord and Taylor, 2012). 
In this paper, I take as starting point recent experiments with robots encountering ethical dilemmas 
reported by Winfeld and collaborators, see (Winfeld et al., 2014).   I compare the dilemmas encountered by 
robots to some well-known thought experiments in ethics, see (Foot, 1967), (Thomson, 1985). I argue that 
a justifiable solution to the dilemmas will require that robots follow ethical principles which go beyond 
consequentialism. I first point to a number of possible ethical principles which may be implemented and 
discuss in some detail one such ethical principle, the double effect principle, which appeals to both 
consequentialist and deontological intuitions. The double effect principle states conditions for ethically 
acceptable behavior when there are both positive and negative consequences of an action. The action must 
itself be positive or neutral, the negative consequence may not be intended whereas the positive must be, 
the negative consequence may not be a means to obtain the positive effect, and the positive effect must be 
proportionally preferable to the negative effect, see e.g. (Mangan, 1949), (Foot, 1967), (Quinn, 1989), 
(McIntyre 2014). 
The main contribution of the paper is a formalization of the double effect principle and a formal application 
of this principle to ethical dilemmas. In particular, I suggest how to handle intentions, causal reasoning and 
proportionality of several positive or negative consequences of an action in a given situation. I provide a 
formal semantics for the formalization which is based upon Action Type Deontic Logic, see (Bentzen, 2014). 
I conclude that although the double effect principle can be criticized from a philosophical point of view as 
guiding the actions of human beings, it is nevertheless fruitful to investigate implementations of the 
principle in robotics.  
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